How neurons make meaning: brain mechanisms for embodied and abstract-symbolic semantics  by Pulvermüller, Friedemann
How neurons make meaning:
brain mechanisms for embodied
and abstract-symbolic semantics
Friedemann Pulvermu¨ller
Brain Language Laboratory, Freie Universita¨t Berlin, 14195 Berlin, Germany
How brain structures and neuronal circuits mechanisti-
cally underpin symbolic meaning has recently been elu-
cidated by neuroimaging, neuropsychological, and
neurocomputational research. Modality-specific ‘em-
bodied’ mechanisms anchored in sensorimotor systems
appear to be relevant, as are ‘disembodied’ mechanisms
in multimodal areas. In this paper, four semantic mech-
anisms are proposed and spelt out at the level of neuro-
nal circuits: referential semantics, which establishes
links between symbols and the objects and actions they
are used to speak about; combinatorial semantics, which
enables the learning of symbolic meaning from context;
emotional-affective semantics, which establishes links
between signs and internal states of the body; and
abstraction mechanisms for generalizing over a range
of instances of semantic meaning. Referential, combina-
torial, emotional-affective, and abstract semantics are
complementary mechanisms, each necessary for proces-
sing meaning in mind and brain.
Symbolic and embodied semantic systems
What is the brain basis of meaning or semantics? Cognitive
psychologists have proposed that semantic and conceptual
processes can be attributed to a dedicated ‘symbolic se-
mantic system’ specialized for handling information about
meaning and concepts related to signs [1,2]. However,
brain imaging work and patient studies suggest that sev-
eral different brain areas play a central role in semantic
processing [3–5], thus casting doubt on the existence of a
single focal ‘hub’ for semantic integration [6]. At the theo-
retical level, a theory of meaning of symbols needs to solve
the semantic grounding problem, namely, how words and
other symbols are related to specific types of perceived
objects and executable actions [7,8]. Theories that rely on a
symbolic system functionally detached from sensory and
motor mechanisms cannot explain semantic grounding [9–
11]. Therefore, an alternative proposal emphasizes seman-
tic grounding of symbols in perception and action systems
of the mind and brain [12–14]. Because words are used to
speak about different types of objects and actions, this
approach implies specific semantic mechanisms that de-
pend on word category (e.g., object vs action words, animal
Review
Glossary
Action and action schema: an action is a motor act connected to a goal.
Individual actions, which take place at a specific time and place, can be
classified into types or action schemas (e.g., GRASPING, DONATING).
Amodal: amodal meaning (or semantics) is defined in abstract space, for example
in terms of abstract semantic features (e.g., BACHELOR = [+human, +adult, +male,
married]). It has been proposed that an amodal semantic system processes
meaning independently of information from the senses. Some researchers also
refer to ‘amodal brain areas’, although every area in cortex in fact receives
information from the senses and connects, at least indirectly, to the motor output.
Arcuate fascicle: fiber bundle that connects the inferior frontal, inferior parietal,
and superior/middle temporal cortex of the human cortex. It is especially well
developed in the left hemisphere.
Combinatorial (or distributional) meaning (semantics): the meaning of words
that becomes evident from the other words with which they typically combine in
constructions and larger discourse (e.g., for ‘strawberry’: red, sweet, enjoy, buy).
Concept and meaning: the meaning of a word is sometimes seen as the
concept related to it. Concepts and meanings can be concrete (EYE, GRASP) or
more abstract (GAME, BEAUTY).
Compositional meaning (semantics): derivation of the meaning of construc-
tions from the meaning of their constituent words plus general combinatorial
principles.
Constituent words: words as parts of a larger construction.
Construction: structurally coherent aggregate of words with specific meaning.
Disembodied: disembodied meaning does not include sensorimotor repre-
sentations, although it may be grounded in action and perception. Disembo-
died meaning processing in multimodal cortex areas is sometimes connected
to the idea of an amodal semantic system, but is equally consistent with
semantic grounding in action and perception.
Embodied: embodied meaning (or semantics) includes representations of
action and object schemas and is assumed to be processed in sensory, motor,
and multimodal areas of cortex.
Grounded: grounded meaning (semantics) is intrinsically related to percep-
tions and actions. The link can be referential (between ‘eye’ and the respective
referential objects) or more distant (‘beauty’ and the variable objects, action
schemas, and scenes to which this word applies). It has been stated that
symbol grounding is necessary for semantics.
Modality-specific, modality-preferential: some parts of cortex are primarily
dedicated to one sensory or motor modality (see sensory, motor). These are
frequently called modality-specific. Because some multimodal convergence exists
in sensory and motor areas, the term modality-preferential areas is more accurate.
Motor: motor areas include primary motor, premotor, and supplementary
motor cortex (Brodmann areas 4, 6, and 44; Figure 1, top left). Neural processes
in these areas control motor acts and contribute to actions.
Multimodal: multimodal areas of cortex are equally dedicated to processing
information from different sensorimotor modalities (e.g., dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex, angular gyrus; Brodmann areas 10, 46, and 39).
Object and prototype: objects in the world can be subsumed under certain words
and concepts (e.g., EYE, GAME). A prototype is a particularly typical and frequently
encountered instantiation of a concept (e.g., brown eyes in southern countries).
Perisylvian cortex: inferior frontal, inferior parietal, and superior temporal
areas surrounding the Sylvian fissure (Figure 1, top left). In almost all right-
handed and most left-handed people, the perisylvian cortex of the left
hemisphere is most relevant for language.
Semantic hub: unique brain area equally necessary for processing all types of
meaning.Semantics: the (science of the) meaning of words and constructions.
Sensory: sensory areas include primary and adjacent higher visual, auditory,
somatosensory, olfactory, and gustatory cortex. Activity in these areas is
necessary for sensory perception.1364-6613/$ – see front matter
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vs tool names) [15,16]. Support for different category-spe-
cific semantic brain mechanisms comes from patients with
focal brain lesions and category-specific semantic deficits
[17,18] and from neuroimaging work that demonstrates
activation of sensory and motor areas that reflect aspects of
word and sentence meaning [10,12,19,20]. These results
support models of category-specific semantic grounding
and meaning embodiment in sensory and motor systems.
However, it has also been argued that lesions sometimes
compromise sensory or motor processing without impact-
ing on semantics and some semantic deficits appear with-
out concordant sensorimotor impairment, thus supporting
their meaning in left [5] or bilateral [29] m/iTC has
been suggested on the basis of neuroimaging results;
lesion evidence also supports this position.
(v) Anterior temporal cortex (aTC): semantic dementia
(SD), a severe and specific semantic deficit, is
characterized by severe lesions of both temporal poles
(TPs) [3]; some neuroimaging results also point to a
role of TPs in semantic processing. Recent work shows
the best correlation between semantic deficit and
reductions in metabolic brain activation in anterior
fusiform gyrus rather than TP [30]; data from stroke
patients indicate similar roles of left aTC and other
semantic areas in causing semantic errors [31].
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 2013, Vol. 17, No. 9‘disembodied’ semantic mechanisms that can dissociate
from sensorimotor functions and brain areas [3,21].
To explain semantic processing and representation in
the human mind and brain, the new data and positions
that have emerged in this ‘embodiment debate’ need to be
integrated with each other. In this review, four different
semantic mechanisms are identified as essential and spelt
out neuromechanistically in an attempt to develop an
integrative neurosemantic proposal that covers both em-
bodied and abstract-symbolic processes in both modality-
specific and multimodal areas of the brain. First, referen-
tial semantic mechanisms for linking symbols to objects
and actions are contrasted with mechanisms for combining
symbols with each other. Then symbol grounding in emo-
tion and the wide applicability spectrum of some terms are
discussed in an attempt to account for aspects of abstract
concepts. A final section focuses on the interplay between
‘embodied’ and ‘disembodied’ semantic systems in abstract
sentence processing.
Semantic hubs and the symbolic system
Semantic processing may occur in an integration center or
‘semantic hub’ that joins together the various aspects of a
word’s meaning [3], for example, in the case of the word
‘fish’, about shape, color, smell and taste. Although a
specialized area is in fact not necessary for integration
of semantic information – because the binding of multi-
modal semantic features into one coherent representation
may rely on long-range cortico–cortical connections [16] – it
is possible that such a single hub exists. However, neuro-
imaging and neuropsychological studies have revealed
several cortical regions that may support general meaning
processes (Figure 1, top):
(i) Inferior frontal cortex (iFC): the anterior part of Broca’s
area and adjacent tissue in left iFC (Brodmann areas,
BA, 44, 45, and 47) are active in semantic processing
and functional changes in iFC impact on them [4,22].
(ii) Superior temporal cortex (sTC): Wernicke’s area, the
classic posterior language area in and adjacent to the
superior temporal gyrus and sulcus [23], has been
emphasized as a semantic processor on the basis of
lesion, perfusion, and imaging data [24–26].
(iii) Inferior parietal cortex (iPC): angular and adjacent
supramarginal gyrus in iPC provide another candi-
date region for a semantic hub [6,27] that is most
strongly active during semantic processing of cross-
modal spatial and temporal configurations [6,28].
(iv) Inferior and middle temporal cortex (m/iTC): a
general semantic binding site between words andAlthough each candidate semantic hub is, by itself, con-
sistent with the idea of an amodal semantic system [1,2], all
the results taken together suggest that a wide variety of
areas are important for general meaning processing, and
this undermines the idea of a unique local center for seman-
tic integration. Semantic integration mechanisms draw on
higher association areas of the neocortex, that is, the multi-
modal convergence zones in prefrontal, posterior parietal,
and anterior, inferior, and posterior temporal cortex, and
possibly even anterior and posterior cingulate and other
corticolimbic structures [6], where sensory, motor, and
affective emotional information converges. These areas
are known to function as convergence zones of information
from several modalities, rather than as functionally isolated
modules of amodal information processing [32].
Semantic category specificity and embodiment
On closer examination, all of the candidate semantic hubs
appear to contribute to semantics differentially. Typical
lesions in each of the five potential hubs do not affect all
words alike; instead, words from one semantic category
may suffer more than words from other categories. Con-
cordant with these observations, neuroimaging studies
show that semantic areas are activated to different degrees
when different semantic types are being processed:
(i) Left iFC and bilateral frontocentral motor systems
become most strongly active in the processing of
action-related words and phrases, and lesions in
these areas, as seen with stroke and dementia, lead to
relatively pronounced impairments in processing of
action-related words and concepts compared to
matched control items (Box 1) [12,33–37].
(ii) Bilateral sTC is especially active in response to words
related to sounds, and lesions in left sTC impair
sound word processing more than that for other
(matched) words [20,38].
(iii) Left iPC, especially supramarginal gyrus, is most
strongly activated by spatial language, and iPC
lesions most strongly affect spatially related lan-
guage, including prepositions [39,40]. Angular gyrus
and intraparietal sulcus in iPC are of special
importance for processing number words and con-
cepts [41,42].
(iv) Different parts of m/iTC show category-specific effects
for animal, tool, and person names, color- and form-
related words, and emotion terms in both activation
and lesion studies [12,18,32,43].459
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Figure 1. Semantic brain mechanisms: hubs, category specificity, and semantic circuits. Top left: Left cortical hemisphere with Brodmann area numbers indicated; the left-
perisylvian language areas are highlighted (adapted from [55]). Top middle: Areas of particular importance for general semantic processing as proposed in the literature.
Top right: Cortical areas for which semantic category-specific effects have been reported in the literature. Middle panels: Model of general lexico–semantic circuits (leftmost
graph) and referential–semantic circuits for four different semantic word types (as indicated). Bottom panels: Results of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
cluster analysis (views from left and from top) revealing activation clusters common to all word types tested (leftmost graph) and category-specific activation to four
different semantic word types. Cluster analysis contrasts activation patterns elicited by individual word categories (each tested against a control condition of matched
meaningless symbol strings) with each other and with those activations shared by combinations of semantic categories (adapted from [79]). Category-specific semantic
circuits are distributed over different areas of both hemispheres and lexico–semantic circuits shared by all words are localized in left perisylvian areas. Note the rich
category-specific activations, which confirm some of the model predictions, but also call for model extensions. Abbreviations: iFC, inferior frontal cortex; iPC, inferior
parietal cortex; sTC, superior temporal cortex; m/iTC, middle/inferior temporal cortex; aTC, anterior temporal cortex; TP, temporal pole.
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 2013, Vol. 17, No. 9(v) Differences in the ability to process semantic catego-
ries have also been observed after lesion in aTL
[17,32] and in SD due to TP lesion [44,45].
Thus, all putative semantic hubs seem to show at least a
degree of category specificity. It is possible that some of
these category differences can potentially be explained by
close adjacency of true hubs and category preferential
areas, but the data are equally open to the possibility that460potential hub areas preferentially process specific seman-
tic types.
Category-specific semantic effects also appear for
regions far beyond the hub candidates, in and close to
modality-specific – or, more accurately, modality-preferen-
tial – sensory and motor areas. In superior temporal
auditory and inferior temporal visual areas, sound and
visually related words such as ‘bell’ and ‘grass’ yield the
strongest activation, and focal lesions can cause semantic
Box 1. Action semantics in the dorsal stream
Some brain language models attribute semantics to areas in the
temporo-occipital ventral stream of processing of visual object-related
information (yellow/orange areas in top middle and right panel of
Figure 1). However, recent evidence showed that frontoparietal areas
in the dorsal stream (red, purple, and green areas) are also active in
semantic processing and that lesions here lead to severe linguistic–
conceptual impairments, especially in the processing of action-related
meaning [12,20,33,35]. For example, motor neuron disease, a
degenerative brain disease that affects frontoparietal cortex including
precentral motor systems, is characterized by motor deficits and
concordant conceptual–semantic deficits in the processing of action
information [35]. In functional imaging studies, semantic somatotopy
was found in precentral motor and premotor cortex, showing that
words (both verbs and nouns), phrases, and sentences semantically
related to different parts of the body (e.g., ‘talk’, ‘fork’, and ‘walk’)
activate ventral face/mouth, lateral arm/hand, and dorsal leg/foot
motor regions, respectively [80]. Semantic–somatotopic activation has
been confirmed by a range of fMRI studies (Figure I; [81]) and in MEG
and EEG studies it emerged as rapidly as the earliest signs of cortical
meaning processing reported so far (pre-N400 responses with a
latency of 100–250 ms), thus arguing that meaning-related motor
activity indexes early semantic access rather than late post-under-
standing inferences [20,82,83]. Furthermore, experimental studies
have demonstrated a causal effect of focal motor systems activation
– induced by magnetic brain stimulation [84,85] and behavioral
procedures [50,86,87] – on the processing of action-related language.
There are two main reasons why dorsal-stream action semantics is
important for cognitive theory. First, claims about semantic category
specificity and its relationship to motor and sensory brain systems had
remained suggestive because most category-specific deficits were
seen for large lesions [17] and category-specific functional activation
was typically seen adjacent to, but not in, sensory regions [43].
Crucially, motor activation of action-semantic processing was found in
regions of interest defined by motor localizer tasks, thus strengthening
the argument for embodied semantics grounded in action and
perception systems of the brain and mind [12,13]. Second, after
behaviorism had been overcome by the cognitive revolution of the
1950s, motor processes had been seen as epiphenomenal to cognitive
and mental mechanisms. However, on the basis of theoretical
arguments, semanticists had long emphasized the important criterial
role of action and interaction for semantics [71,72,88], an insight
whose re-entry into the cognitive field was, in part, sparked by
empirical evidence of action semantics in the context of emerging
interest in embodied cognition [13,14,20,68,89–91].
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Figure I. Semantic somatotopy in the motor system. Activity foci observed in studies of action word and sentence processing semantically related to actions
preferentially performed with the face/mouth (symbols in green), arms/hands (red) and legs/feet (blue). Note that neural indices of semantic body-part relationships are
present in central and precentral frontal, but not in postcentral parietal areas. Adapted, with permission, from [81]. The data displayed are from [75,79–81,92–100].
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 2013, Vol. 17, No. 9and conceptual deficits for these categories [20,38,44].
Category specificity is present in and close to the piriform
and anterior insular olfactory cortex, where odor words
such as ‘cinnamon’ lead to greater activation than control
words do [46]; in the gustatory cortex in anterior insula and
frontal operculum, where taste words such as ‘sugar’ lead
to relatively strong activation [47]; and in the ventral,
lateral, and dorsal motor system, including primary motor
and premotor, along with adjacent prefrontal and anterior
parietal areas. In motor cortex, a fine-grained semantic
map reflects the body-part relationship of action-related
words, phrases, and sentences, and potentially additional
features of the action schemas these signs relate to seman-
tically (Box 1).Neuroscience integration of semantic models
The overlap and adjacency of many of the category-
specific semantic areas with sensory and motor areas
suggests common mechanisms for action, perception,
and semantic processing [20,48], a postulate also imma-
nent to cognitive theories of semantic embodiment [49–
51]. Arguably, the observation of disembodied semantic
functions in multimodal association cortices far removed
from sensory and motor fields contradicts this view [52].
To understand semantic mechanisms, an integration of
these positions with each other is required, as is an
explanation of why different aspects of semantics relate
to different multimodal and modality-preferential brain
parts (Figure 2).461
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Figure 2. Cortico–cortical connectivity, word form circuit formation, and combinatorial semantic learning. Top left: Long-range cortico–cortical connections within the
perisylvian language cortex and adjacent areas. Abbreviations: IFS, inferior frontal sulcus; PrCS, precentral sulcus; CS, central sulcus; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; STS, superior
temporal sulcus. Numbers indicate Brodmann areas (reproduced, with permission, from [54]). Top right: Neuroanatomical subdivision of inferior frontal and superior temporal
cortex into six areas: M1, primary motor; PM, premotor; PF, prefrontal; A1, primary auditory; AB, auditory belt; and PB, auditory parabelt areas (adapted from [61]). Middle:
Schematic connection structure of the six areas highlighted in the top right panel. Correlated activation in M1 and A1 during articulations leads to spreading activation in the
network and distributed circuit formation for syllables and words. Their richer connectivity determines that PF and PB develop memory-active circuit cores [67], by means of
which word-form circuits become linked to each other in combinatorial learning. Bottom: Combinatorial learning of noun–verb co-occurrences in an auto-associative neuronal
network model. Word pair co-occurrence data are shown in the table on the left (verbs in top row, nouns in left column; numbers denote co-occurrences in the British National
Corpus). The bottom right panel shows neuronal elements for the same words and connections between neural elements detecting individual pair sequences. Black lines show
learnt connections between sequences including semantically similar nouns and verbs. The formation of ad hoc semantic categories (yellow circles, e.g. nouns for humans vs
flying objects and human-specific actions/mental activities vs flying actions) results from mapping of word–word correlations (adapted from [66]).
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 2013, Vol. 17, No. 9An explanation of the location of semantic brain pro-
cesses is offered by semantic theory at the level of neuronal
circuit structure and function. Neuroanatomy offers im-
portant brain structural information about within- and
between-area connections in the cortex. Neurophysiology
revealed equally important neurofunctional principles
that specify the way learning is realized at the level of
nerve cells and neuronal populations. A neural key to
learning is the correlation learning principle: neurons that
fire together wire together and neurons out of sync delink462[53]. Together with structural knowledge about long-dis-
tance cortico–cortical connections – especially about the
human-specific dorsal left-lateralized arcuate fascicle link-
ing together inferior frontal and temporoparietal cortex
(Figure 2, top left) [54] – this principle offers a range of
explanations for brain topographies of linguistic and se-
mantic processes [12,16,55].
Pronouncing a word form requires activation patterns in
(frontal) articulatory motor systems of the speaker and
leads to specific (temporoparietal) activation of auditory
Box 2. Automatic versus context-modulated semantics
It has been argued that linguistic and semantic brain activations are to
some degree independent of attention [48,102,103]. This means that
neuronal, behavioral, and cognitive signs of semantic activation can
be observed even if subjects do not attend to symbols or their
meaning. Several studies using fast neurophysiological brain imaging
have demonstrated such automatic semantics [82,104,105]. However,
the fact that attention-to-stimuli is not necessary still allows the
possibility that task, behavioral, and linguistic contexts influence and
modulate neurocognitive semantic processes. To what degree are
semantic processes flexible and how can such flexibility be explained?
This question has recently been addressed by numerous studies of
action semantics. The results suggest several mechanisms.
Masking by motor responses: Semantic activations in motor areas
are small and can be overridden by motor-related brain activity. Overt
motor tasks strongly activate the motor system and preparatory motor
activity is present when subjects are in a state of readiness to act, even
in the absence of immediate overt responses [106]. Concordant motor
preparation processes may explain why action-semantic responses
are sometimes missing in precentral areas but still persist in inferior
parietal areas when subjects perform button press tasks [100].
Therefore, several studies revealing action-semantic brain activation
used non-response tasks [80]. Moving a finger in the context of a
button press task may even cancel semantic activation of left-
hemispheric hand/arm areas while still allowing leg- or face-word-
related activation of dorsal or ventral motor systems to appear [107].
Attention to signs and meaning: A range of studies have shown that
task-induced attention to aspects of meaningful stimuli can alter the
brain response to these items. According to current theory [108] and
neurcomputational work [61], attention boosts the local cortical
response, for example, by adjusting the gain of activation-level
control and competition mechanisms. Local modulations of brain
manifestations of action semantics seen for attention and task
[95,109,110] are consistent with this position.
Semantic priming: Even if the same neurosemantic circuit ignites
each time a target word appears in the input, the degree of pre-
activation explains why the neuronal circuit of a target is activated
more rapidly after a semantically related prime-word [111] and with
less additional cortical activity compared to an unprimed presentation
[112]. Note that it is normally the difference between baseline
responses and those to critical target stimuli that is interpreted as
the neurocognitive response to the target. Therefore, pre-activation
(priming) of semantic brain systems (including motor systems) due to
semantic priming during baseline reduces the relative activation to the
target [105,113].
Syntactic and semantic context: Syntactic and semantic context
modifies action semantic processes. Such modulation has been
shown for verbs appearing in the first versus the third person [114],
action sentences including nouns and verbs with and without overtly
realized grammatical endings [115], statements attributing actions to
humans versus animals [83], and positive versus negation action
statements [116,117]. These intriguing results are of great relevance
for understanding the interplay between action semantics and other
facets of language processing. For example, the reduction of semantic
brain responses in motor systems and temporal poles to sentences
including grammatical materials (Figure I [115]) may be due to
perisylvian grammatical circuit activations competing with, and partly
suppressing, semantic circuits. Likewise, the down-modulation of
motor processes with negation may index interactions between
semantic circuits for negation and action representations [116,117].
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Figure I. Grammatically driven flexibility of semantic activation in the motor
system and anterior temporal cortex. Simple action sentences (her/they grasp;
top left panels) produce stronger semantic activations in precentral and anterior
temporal cortex than similar sentences that include additional grammatical
materials (with inflectional affixes on the nouns and verbs, e.g., she/their grasps;
top right). Such grammatical modulation occurs in extrasylvian areas that index
semantic processing (bottom, blue bars) but not in perisylvian language areas
(red bars; reproduced, with permission, from [115]).
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 2013, Vol. 17, No. 9and somatosensory systems due to self-perceived sounds
and movements. Fronto–temporal connections are typical-
ly left-lateralized, so the left hemisphere takes a lead role
in mapping correlated articulatory–auditory information
[56]. The emerging circuits are localized in frontotemporal
perisylvian cortex, with an important contribution of motor
areas [57], and can be seen as cortical correlates of spoken
word forms (Figure 2, top and middle panels). If word
meaning is grounded in the visual shapes of objects, theword form circuit is active together with neural activity in
the ventral–temporal visual stream related to the proces-
sing of visual object information. Correlation learning links
the word and object circuits, resulting in an embodied object-
semantic representation. Likewise, correlations between
word and sound-, smell-, taste-, or action-related informa-
tion lead to the establishment of embodied referential se-
mantic circuits, including perisylvian neuronal populations,
along with circuits in auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and463
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 2013, Vol. 17, No. 9motor cortex. Action–perception correlation thus explains
category-specific semantic grounding and embodied brain
correlates of semantic word types in specific sensorimotor
areas (Figure 1, middle panel; Box 2) [12,20].
How would this mechanistic approach address semantic
processing in multimodal areas outside sensory or motor
systems? The key to this question is cortical connectivity.
Distant primary cortices do not strongly link to each other
directly; major connections are via intermediary areas. For
activity to travel between primary auditory and motor
cortices, a number of areas need to be traversed, including
premotor and prefrontal cortex in the frontal lobe, and the
auditory belt and parabelt in superior temporal cortex
(Figure 2, middle panel) [54,58–61]. Likewise, the connec-
tion between primary visual cortex and language areas is
indirect, for example, via hubs, that is, interlinking relay
areas, in temporo-occipital and middle temporal cortex
[62]. To link the spoken word form ‘grasp’ to the concordant
motor movement, or the articulation pattern for pronounc-
ing the word ‘grass’ to specific visual knowledge about color
and shape, nerve cells in motor and sensory areas are
necessary; in addition, intermediary area neurons are
equally required to build circuits that bind sensory and
motor information. Neuroanatomical structure determines
that the emerging circuits include neurons in modality-
nonspecific areas of cortex. Therefore, semantic grounding,
that is, the linking of symbols to information in the senses
and the motor system (and thus correlated activation in
perisylvian and modality-preferential brain systems), nec-
essarily recruits ‘higher’ multimodal relay areas that bridge
different modality-preferential systems (Figure 2, middle
panel) [9,16]. As a result, semantic circuits are distributed
over both types of areas. Convergence and divergence of
connections between modality-preferential and -general
areas explains why sensorimotor semantic activation is
particularly specific to semantic category, whereas interme-
diary convergence area activity is less so, and thus some-
times creates the impression of general semantic hubs.
Whether specific areas of cortex tend to respond to
specific word types or rather to all words alike can be
explored objectively using cluster analysis performed on
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data.
There are indeed category-specific areas that preferen-
tially respond to one semantic word type, and these are seen
across the entire cortex (Figure 1, bottom panels). There are
also areas that respond similarly to different semantic word
types; these latter areas are multimodal and in the periph-
ery of or adjacent to the perisylvian language areas in iFC,
sTC, and m/iTC (shown in brown in Figure 1, bottom left).
These results support both semantic embodiment and dis-
embodiment at the neural level.
Combinatorial semantics
A wealth of semantic information is captured in the way
words are combined with other words in sentences and
texts. Combinatorial (sometimes also called distributional)
semantic models express meaning similarity in terms of
vectors derived from the probability of the co-occurrence of
words with other words in texts [63]. Learning from context
is sometimes seen as a paradigm case of acquiring dis-
embodied semantics. However, it must be acknowledged464that if a stock of words is semantically grounded in action
and perception knowledge, these words can form the basis
of a form of secondary grounding (or ‘symbolic theft’)
[11,64]. Correlation learning implies such semantic links
between co-active novel word-form circuits and embodied
referential representations activated as part of previously
learnt semantic circuits.
Because correlated activation of neuronal circuits
strengthens the connections between them, the cortex
appears to be an ideal device for mapping the co-occurrence
probabilities of words. Indeed, neural networks that learn to
connect word forms by Hebbian mechanisms can map com-
binatorial properties of language [65]. Interestingly, even
such combinatorial learning per se leads to the emergence of
ad hoc semantic categories (Figure 2, bottom) [66]. Because
all words share circuits in left-perisylvian language areas,
disembodied combinatorial information is best mapped in or
close to these regions, although the possibility exists that
additional areas become involved, especially in binding
between words with similar referential meaning. Partly
in line with the left-perisylvian predominance of combina-
torial mechanisms, two of the putative semantic hubs, in
anterior inferior frontal cortex and superior temporal cortex,
fall on the rim of the perisylvian cortex (Figure 1, top
middle). However, why they do not fill the entire perisylvian
space still awaits explanation, which is possible based on the
internal dynamics of linguistic circuits: because conver-
gence zones (relay areas) typically show richer neuroana-
tomical connectivity with other relevant areas than
sensorimotor areas do, they may be more efficient in main-
taining activity after circuit activation [67]. Prolonged ac-
tivity of iFC and sTC neurons constituting the cores of
linguistic circuits may thus underlie learning of word co-
occurrences in contexts (Figure 2, middle).
From motion to emotion: from action to abstraction
A classic argument against embodiment in its strict form is
based on abstract meaning. Whereas the meanings of the
words ‘eye’ and ‘grasp’ can be explained, to a degree, by
pointing to objects and actions, those of ‘beauty’ and ‘free-
dom’ cannot. It may be that some common sensorimotor
knowledge is immanent in FREEING actions or instantia-
tions of BEAUTY [68], but it seems likely that additional
semantic binding principles are behind such concepts. So
might it be necessary, after all, to place abstract semantics
in an amodal meaning system? A remarkable observation
has recently been offered that may be of the essence in this
context: abstract terms show an over-proportionally strong
tendency to be semantically linked to knowledge about
emotions [10,69]. This additional embodied–semantic link
accounts for advantages in processing speed for abstract
emotional terms over otherwise matched control words [69].
In addition, abstract words strongly activate anterior cin-
gulate cortex, a site known to be relevant for emotion
processing [70]. Thus, it appears that at least some abstract
words are semantically grounded in emotion knowledge.
Abstract emotion words as a test case for semantic
theories
If abstract emotion words indeed receive their meaning
through grounding in emotion [69], it is of crucial relevance
Arm Face
Emoon
TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences 
Figure 3. Semantic embodiment of abstract emotion words. Brain activation (event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging) to face-related action words (in green),
arm-related action words (in blue), and abstract emotion words (in red), each contrasted with activation for matched meaningless strings of repeated familiar symbols. Note
that the inferior motor and premotor cortex sparked by face and arm words is also active for abstract emotion words. In addition, there is activation of the anterior insula
and a range of other limbic structures. Reproduced, with permission, from [73].
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 2013, Vol. 17, No. 9to explain how emotion grounding is established. Note that
an amodal semantic system account does not address this
question. Even if such a system contained an inborn emo-
tion concept of JOY, it is left unexplained how the learner
knows to relate the concept to its corresponding word, andBox 3. Grounding by correlation: mechanisms for concrete and a
Both concrete and abstract words and constructions can be learnt
when they are being used to speak about real-life events, actions, and
objects or their features. A major difference lies in the variability of the
sensorimotor patterns that foster semantic grounding, which is
typically low for concrete and high for abstract symbols. This
difference in correlation structure may yield different neuronal and
cognitive mechanisms for concrete and abstract meaning.
Concrete semantics: The concrete word ‘eye’ is used to speak about
objects with similar shapes and a range of colors. At the neurocog-
nitive level, this leads to exemplar representations that strongly
overlap in their sensorimotor semantic feature neurons, possibly
dominated by a frequently processed prototype. The upper panel in
Figure I schematically illustrates such sensorimotor semantic overlap
(some of which may be carried by visual center-surround cells that
respond to a circle in one color on a background of a different one) and
feature neurons more specific to individual exemplars (e.g., to a
specific color). In concrete semantic learning, neurons of the circuit
overlap and frequently occurring prototypical exemplars strongly
interlink with the word form circuit owing to the high correlation of
their activations.
Abstract semantics: The instantiations of abstract words such as
‘games’ and ‘beauty’ are quite variable, exhibiting a ‘family resem-
blance’ pattern of partial semantic similarity [71]. The bottom panel in
Figure I schematically shows the putative neural correlate of such
family resemblance, where sensorimotor semantic feature neurons
are only shared between subsets of exemplar representations of
variable instantiations of the concept. The low correlation of activa-
tions of neuronal circuits for word forms and for each exemplar
representation results in weak links between neural representations of
sensorimotor knowledge (in modality-preferential areas) and those of
verbal symbols (in perisylvian cortex). Abstract semantic connections
can draw on partial-overlap feature neurons (as shown) and indirectnot, for example, to ‘grief’. The classic answer in semantic
theory is that this is possible, because abstract emotions
and other internal states have characteristic ways in which
they are manifested in the actions and interactions in
which the learner engages with speakers of the languagebstract semantics
connections by way of neurons in multimodal cortex that happen to
link to several sensorimotor instantiations of an abstract meaning (not
shown; [11,118]).
Concrete meaning:
Similar instanaons, semanc feature overlap strongly links to symbol
Abstract meaning:
Dissimilar instanaons, family ressemblance paern, weak links to symbol
Word form ‘beauty’
Word form ‘eye’
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Figure I. Sketch of putative neurobiological mechanisms for concrete and
abstract meaning processing.
465
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 2013, Vol. 17, No. 9[71,72]. Therefore, the link between an abstract emotion
word and its abstract concept is via manifestation of the
latter in prototypical actions. The child learns an abstract
emotion word such as ‘joy’ because it shows JOY-expres-
sing action schemas, which language-teaching adults use
as criteria for correct application of the abstract emotion
word [71,72]. Thus, the manifestation of emotions in
actions becomes the crucial link between word use and
internal state, and hence between sign and meaning. Only
after a stock of abstract emotion words has been grounded
in emotion-expressing action can further emotion terms be
learnt from context.160 ms
Idiomac sentences Literal sentences
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
-1
200 ms
240 ms
280 ms
AKey:
Le
Figure 4. Brain activation for idiomatic and literal sentences recorded using functional m
comparison of brain activation elicited during idiomatic and literal sentence processing (
[78]). Top right: activation for literal and idiomatic sentences that include arm- (red bars)
foot movements elicited activity (reproduced, with permission, from [75]). Bottom le
sentences collapsed). Bottom right: activation time course for arm and leg senten
compositional action-relatedness effects were present simultaneously early on (1
constructional semantic processes emerge instantaneously at the same time (reproduc
466This proposal generates critical predictions testable in
neuroscience experiments. In particular, over and above
activating limbic emotion-related circuits, abstract emo-
tion words should specifically excite the motor system that
controls the face and arms, with which emotions are typi-
cally expressed. Motor system activation for emotion-
expressing body parts was indeed found when adults pas-
sively processed abstract emotion words [73], suggesting
that, for one important class of abstract concepts, semantic
grounding in emotion-expressing action is of the essence
and can, in part, explain the meaning–symbol link
(Figure 3).58, 35
-54, 44
-51, 52
-33, 68
-25, 73 -15, 76 -5, 75
-42, 60
Arm sentences Leg sentences
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agnetic resonance imaging (top) and magnetoencephalography (bottom). Top left:
white, idiomatic>literal; black, literal>idiomatic; reproduced, with permission, from
 and leg-related words (blue bars); the red and blue areas indicate where finger and
ft: activation time course for idiomatic and literal action sentences (arm and leg
ces (idiomatic and literal collapsed). Note that constructional idiomaticity and
50–200 ms), suggesting that action-embodied compositional and disembodied
ed, with permission, from [101]).
Box 4. Outstanding questions
General questions
 How many semantic mechanisms are there? Is it sufficient to
distinguish modality-preferential referential, combinatorial, emo-
tional, and variable-abstract semantic mechanisms?
 What roles do sensorimotor and multimodal association areas
play in processing of meaning?
 To what degree is meaning learnt and generalized from experi-
ence or preprogrammed in the genetic code?
Specific questions
 Does semantic learning from experience and from context lead to
different semantic representations in mind and brain?
 What is the activation time course for modality-preferential and
multimodal regions in referential and abstract semantic proces-
sing?
 Is the influence that sensorimotor and language regions have on
each other during semantic processing facilitatory or inhibitory?
What factors determine the sign of the influence?
 To what degree do modality-preferential and multimodal brain
systems contribute to early and late brain responses known to be
related to processing of meaning (e.g., N160 and N400)?
 What types of abstract words and meanings can be distinguished
according to neurocognitive criteria?
 Do subjects with a developmental deficit in motor function have
problems in processing language that is semantically related to
actions and to abstract emotions?
 When words are used to perform specific social communicative
actions, how does the relevant knowledge about interaction
structure and theory of mind become manifest in the brain?
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 2013, Vol. 17, No. 9Variability and abstraction
As concrete words fall into different semantic classes, so
may abstract words. Indeed, neuroimaging results suggest
very different brain correlates for subtypes of abstract
words and constructions [74,75]. A characteristic feature
of some abstract utterances is the variability of entities
they are typically used to speak about. For most words
related to concrete objects, such as ‘eye’, the entities they
are used to speak about may vary to a degree (in size, form,
and color), but it is normally possible to identify a semantic
schema that can be illustrated by a prototype, a typical best
representative of the schema [76]; less typical variants
may activate the schema representation less than the
prototype itself [77]. For some terms, this model fails,
because their meanings cannot be explained by a single
prototype, but require several of them. Consider the case of
the word ‘game’ [71,72,77], which can refer to diverse
activities ranging from cooperative to competitive, from
group to solitary, and from playful to more serious action.
No single prototype can represent this space of action
schemas, and although prototypical members may be sim-
ilar (European and American football), others are very
different (football and tetris). To capture such variable
family resemblance, the semantic representations need
to link up with variable action and perceptual schemas.
At the neurobiological level, variability means low corre-
lation between words and their possible semantic instan-
tiations, implying that, although word meaning may
originally be grounded in specific action and perception
schemas, the semantic representation in a sense is de-
tached from specific action-perception knowledge. This
process of variability-related disembodiment, which is im-
plied by correlation learning (note the ‘out of sync, delink’
rule), may be effective for many abstract words and con-
cepts. Therefore, abstract words grounded in perceptual
schemas (e.g., ‘beauty’) may detach from their perceptual
schemas stored in posterior inferior temporal cortex, thus
leaving relatively anterior temporal representations weak-
ly linked to these concrete instantiations, whereas abstract
action terms (e.g., ‘free’ and ‘game’) may show the same
process of variability disembodiment in prefrontal and
parietal areas adjacent to sensorimotor cortex. Weak links
between neuronal representations of abstract terms and
their multiple and variable sensorimotor instantiations
may be a hallmark of abstract meaning and key to the
retreat of abstract semantic circuits to multimodal pre-
frontal, parietal, and temporal convergence areas (Box 3).
Interplay between embodied and disembodied
semantics
Acknowledgment of both grounded embodied and disem-
bodied semantic mechanisms will mean that new experi-
mental investigations of the interplay between both will be
possible. A crucial question in the embodiment debate is
whether one of these mechanisms drives the other and
might therefore serve a primary role in semantic proces-
sing, whereas that of the other might be secondary and
potentially under the control of the primary one. It has
been discovered that abstract idiomatic sentences (e.g.,
‘Mary cooked her mother’s goose’) activate inferior and
dorsolateral prefrontal and inferior parietal and anteriortemporal areas more strongly than concrete idiomatic
sentences do [75,78], consistent with disembodied seman-
tic processes of abstract constructions (i.e., the entire
idiomatic sentences) in these multimodal regions. By con-
trast, aspects of the embodied meaning of action words
included in both idioms and literal sentences (e.g., ‘cooked’
in ‘Mary cooked her mother’s meal/goose’ or ‘ran’ in ‘Anna
ran for exercise/president’) was manifest in motor system
activation [75]. Because such motor-system activation that
reflects the meaning of constituent action words was pres-
ent at the point in time at which idiomatic and literal
sentence meaning were disambiguated, the data suggest a
degree of semantic compositional processing of the action-
embodied meaning of constituent words (i.e., of the embed-
ded action words ‘cook’ and ‘run’) in idiomatic sentence
comprehension. Crucially, precise mapping in time using
magnetoencephalography (MEG) showed that the brain
correlates of abstract idiomaticity and those of action-
grounded constituent word meaning occurred at the same
time, at 150–200 ms after onset of the critical, sentence-
disambiguating words (‘goose’/‘meal’ in the above exam-
ples, Figure 4). These results further confirm early seman-
tic activations with the same latency in sensorimotor and
multimodal cortices, and argue against the possibility that
sensorimotor semantic activation might be an epiphenome-
non, just following after, or spilling over from, semantic
system activation elsewhere. If prefrontal and anterior
temporal activations are interpreted as indexes of disembo-
died symbolic system activation, they are manifest together
with embodied semantic activation of the action system.
Furthermore, these results suggest that compositional
semantic processing of action-related words (precentral467
Review Trends in Cognitive Sciences September 2013, Vol. 17, No. 9cortex) and semantic processing of abstract idiomatic con-
structions as a whole (prefrontal and anterior temporal
areas) simultaneously and jointly contribute to idiom com-
prehension.
Concluding remarks
Semantic processes draw on left-perisylvian language
regions and include adjacent areas, multimodal hubs,
and sensory, motor, and limbic areas of the human brain.
Sensorimotor and limbic areas are essential for grounding
language in action, perception, and emotion; the periphery
of the perisylvian cortex engages in combinatorial seman-
tics; and multimodal convergence zones in prefrontal, ante-
rior temporal, and inferior parietal cortex are essential for
processing of abstract meanings generalized over variable
concrete instantiations. Thus, widespread cortical regions
and cortico–cortical long-distance connections provide the
machinery for holding together and integrating semantic
representations and circuits. However, different areas make
very specific contributions to meaning processing, as evi-
denced by area-specific signatures of category-specific
impairments and activations. Future research may further
scrutinize the differential contributions of cortical areas to
semantic processing and especially their functional inter-
play in symbol and construction understanding (Box 4).
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